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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Administrative Law-Carriers-the Interstate Commerce Commission's Authority to Approve Tolerance Regulations-Their Effectiveness
In 1947 shell egg carload freight constituted 0.072 per cent of the
value of the total carload traffic handled by the railroads that year; but
in the same year 1.91 per cent of all claim payments made by the railroads on carload traffic was for damaged eggs !'
The existence of this condition caused the Interstate Commerce
Commission in 1948, on its own motion, to institute proceedings to investigate the transportation of shell eggs in order that it might make
findings and prescribe reasonable regulations for the shipments of eggs
via railroads. 2 At the hearings testimony was taken as to the damage
to eggs caused by inherent weaknesses in eggshell structure,8 the components of damage claims submitted to the railroads, 4 the geographical
areas in which the greatest damage claims arose, 5 and the methods used
in packing and loading eggs. 6 At the close of the hearings the Commission adopted regulations 7 to allow the damage to 5% of the eggs packed
1 Special Regulations, Eggs, 284 I. C. C. 377, 399 (1952).
In 1941 claims against
railroads for damage to eggs throughout the country amounted to approximately
$110,000. In 1947 the claims amounted to $2,338,462.
284 I. C. C. 377 (1952). One hundred thirty-one railroads participated in the
proceedings. The proceedings, begun in 1948, were not concluded until 1952.
3 Id. at 383-384.
Undetected weaknesses in the shell structure are known as
"checks" and "blind checks." "Checks" are small cracks which do not penetrate
below the shell membrane, and which are difficult to discern by ordinary sight
inspection. "Blind checks" are small cracks in the shell which occurred prior to
the laying of the eggs and over which a calcium deposit has formed, making it
impossible to discern the cracks without "candling" the eggs. When these weakshelled eggs are packed and shipped they are naturally liable to give under even
light strain.
' Special Regulations, Eggs, 284 I. C. C. 377, 399 (1952). "Many elements
other than the actual value of the eggs enter into a damage claim. For instance,
such claims include the loss incident to the damage, the labor charges and the
materials used in reconditioning the cases, and the warehouse charges covering the
extra expense of handling the cases containing damaged eggs."
'1d. at 396-400. The largest volume of claims arose in the New York City area.
' Special Regulations, Eggs, 284 I. C. C. 377, 390 (1952). The packaging and
loading procedure had been of concern to the Commission previously, 52 I. C. C.
47 (1919). The railroads have conducted "extensive research" relative to loss and
damage claims to shell eggs. Buffing materials of rubber and excelsior pads were
utilized to minimize shock. Apparently many of these experiments were unsuccessful, and no practical method was discovered whereby occurrence of damage
could
be reduced.
7
Id. at 407-408. The following schedule was proposed by the railroads during
the hearings:
"Section 6.-On eggs placed in packages at rail point of origin of the shipment,
no claim shall be allowed where the physical damage to the eggs at destination does
not exceed 4% of the contents of the packages containing damaged eggs. Where
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at points other than railheads to go uncompensated, and the damage to
3% of the eggs packed at railheads to go uncompensated. An exception
was made when the shipper supplied the carrier with a certificate from
a bona fide inspector, either state or federal, indicating the amount of
damaged eggs delivered to the carriers in each shipment. In such cases
the shipper could recover all damage shown to be in excess of that recorded on the certificate, minus a deduction of 1%.8 From this, it is
patent that the five and three per cent tolerance allowances were intended to offset damage estimated to have occurred prior to the shipment
of eggs.
Subsequently, suit was brought to have the order of the Interstate
Commerce Commission effectuating the tolerance regulations set aside
and enjoined. 9 Taking a long range view of the situation, the district
court found the Commission's rules to be reasonable.' 0 In so doing, the
court pointed to the tremendous economic interests concerned,," the
difficulties extant in evolving a method whereby those interests could
be balanced, 1 2 and the Commission's responsibility to foster sound economic conditions in transportation.' 3
damage exceeds 4%, claims shall be for all damage in excess of 4% if investigation
develops carrier liability.
"Exception.-Where bona fide certificates of Federal or State egg inspection
agencies showing extent of physical damage to eggs determined at rail point of
origin of the shipment immediately prior to tender for rail transportation indicate
the actual shell damage to be other than 3%, the percentage of actual damage as
shown on such certificates, plus 1% shall be used in lieu of 4% specified in this
Section.
"Section 7.-On eggs placed in packages at points other than the rail point of
origin, no claim shall be allowed where the physical damage to the eggs at destination does not exceed 6% of the contents of the packages containing damaged eggs.
Where damage exceeds 6% claims shall be allowed in excess of 6%, if investigation
develops
carrier liability."
8
Id.at 402-403.
'Utah Poultry & Farmers Coop. v. United -States, 119 F. Supp. 846 (D. C. Utah
1954).
10
Id.at 864.
" Id.at 850. "Where such an immense volume of traffic, running into thousands
of cars and millions of cases of eggs,... and such tremendous freight charges and
damage claim payments, running into millions of dollars .... are involved, the economic stability of carriers and the maintenance of an adequate national system of
railroads, were [sic] substantially affected."
" Id. at 851. "The problem of claims against railroads for damage to egg shipments had been before the railroads and the Commission for many years and never
satisfactorily solved. It is extremely difficult of solution. It constitutes a part of
the whole problem of the rate structure, which courts many times have held requires the experience and judgment of the Commission.
"The Commission could not expect the railroads to continue to take these losses.
That was uneconomic to the point of being injurious to the national railroad transportation system ....
.... "Rate increases were not the remedy. That would have imposed a
greater cost upon the shippers throughout the nation than the present regulation.
That would have been more unjust for it would penalize some shippers for the
benefit of others. That would not have benefited the shippers of eggs. That would
tend'3
to
cause
the railroads to lose all of the business."
Id.
at 850.
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Complainants14 appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States,"0
attacking the regulations on six grounds.' 6 The Court considered only
the appellants' contention that the Commission's findings did not support
the conclusion that tolerance regulations placed no limitation on the carrier's liability. On the grounds that the Commission had not shown
that the tolerance did not in part consist of damage caused by the carrier,
the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court.
A crucial point raised by the appellants in the hearings below 1 7 was
not considered by the majority of the Court. Did the Interstate Commerce Commission have the power to promulgate tolerance regulations,
or is it precluded from so doing by § 20(11) of the Interstate Commerce
Act?' 8
The answer to this question depends upon: (1) the scope of the Commission's power to require and to determine that rates and services
established by the common carriers are reasonable, and whether the
making of tolerance regulations is a part of this power; (2) the limitation that § 20(11)19 imposes on the Commission's power to determine
1, The complainants were: Utah Poultry & Farmers Cooperative; Armour &
Co. (Intervenor) ; Swift & Co. (Intervenor) ; United States Department of Agriculture.
1 Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 350 U. S. 162 (1956).
" The bases for attack were: "(1) the Commission has no jurisdiction over
damage clahns and hence no power to prescribe regulationsgoverning their disposition; (2) tolerances based on averages necessarily embrace a forbidden limitation
of liability since, by definition, some shipments will contain less than the 'average'
damage, resulting in those cases in the carrier being relieved of its full liability;
(3) the railroads are liable for in-transit damage even though 'unavoidable'; (4)
the averages found by the Commission are not supported by the evidence; (5) the
approval of uniform nation-wide tolerances was unreasonable in light of the wide
differences in the egg-damage experience of consignees located in different areas
of the country; and (6) the conclusion that the tolerances do not limit liability is
not supported by the Commission's findings." [Emphasis added.] Id. at 165.
" This point was raised in -the hearing in the District Court, Utah Poultry &
Farmers Coop. v. United States, 119 F. Supp. 846 (D. C. Utah 1954), and in the
Commission hearings, Special Regulations, Eggs, 284 I. C. C. 377, 401 (1952).
18 Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 350 U. S. 162, 176 (1956)
(Dissenting opinion).
19 For the purposes of this note, the pertinent part of 24 STAT. 385 (1887), as
amended, 49 U. S. C. § 20(11) (1953) is as follows:
"Any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company subject to the provisions of this chapter receiving property for transportation from a point in one
State or Territory or the District of Columbia to a point in another State, .. .
shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor, and shall be liable to the lawful holder
thereof for any loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it or by any
common carrier, railroad, or transportation company to which such property may
be delivered or over whose line or lines such property may pass within the United
States or within an adjacent foreign country when transported on a through bill
of lading, and no contract, receipt, rule, regulation, or other limitation of any
character whatsoever shall exempt such common carrier, railroad, or transportation company from the liability hereby imposed; and any such common carrier,
railroad or transportation company so receiving property for transportation, . . .
or . . . delivering said property so received and transported shall be liable to the
lawful holder of said receipt or bill of lading or to any party entitled to recover
thereon, whether such receipt or bill of lading has been issued or not, for the full
actual loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it or by any such com-
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the reasonableness of rates and services; and (3) the procedure for determining the common law liability of carriers and the exemptions therefrom.
Power to Regulate Rates
Congress amended the Interstate Commerce Act20 by the Hepburn
Amendment of 1906.21 By that amendment, under § 15,22 Congress gave
the Interstate Commerce Commission the power to establish and enforce "just and reasonable" charges for services "rendered or to be
rendered" in the transportation of persons and property.23 Although
the immediate aim of the amendment was to eliminate unfair practices
by railroads against the shippers, 24 it was also intended to insure the
carriers a reasonable return for their services.2 5 Necessarily, the Common carrier, railroad, or transportation company to which such property may be
delivered or over whose line or lines such property may pass within the United
States or within an adjacent foreign country when transported on a through bill
of lading, notwithstanding any limitation of liability or limitation of the amount of
recovery or representation or agreement as to value in any such receipt or bill of
lading, or in any contract, rule, regulation, or in any tariff filed with the Interstate
Commerce Commission; and any such limitation, without respect to the manner or
form in which it is sought to be made is declared to be unlawful and void. . .
2134 STAT. 589 (1906).
2024 STAT. 384 (1887).
2
For the purpose of this note the pertinent part of 24 STAT. 384 (1887), as
amended, 49 U. S. C. § 15 (1953) is as follows:
"Whenever, after full hearing, upon a complaint made as provided in section 13
of this title, or after full hearing under an order for investigation and hearing made
by the commission on its own initiative, either in extension of any pending complaint or without any complaint whatever, the commission shall be of the opinion
that any individual or joint rate, fare, or charge whatsoever demanded, charged,
or collected by any common carrier or carriers subject to this chapter for the transor that any individual or joint classification,
portation of persons or property ....
regulation, or practice whatsoever of such carrier or carriers subject to the provisions of this chapter, is or will be unjust or unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory or unduly preferential or prejudicial, or otherwise in violation of any of the
provisions of this chapter, the commission is authorized and empowered to determine and prescribe what will be the just and reasonable individual or joint rate,
fare, or charge, or rates, fares or charges, to be thereafter observed in such
case ... "
"We have declared in virtue of our powers,
2240 CONG. REc. 2230 (1906).
"That all charges for any service rendered or to be rendered in the transportation
of persons or property or in connection therewith shall be just and reasonable."
, 40 CONG. REC. 2224 (1906). "The immediate and most pressing need, so far
as legislation is concerned, is the enactment into law of some scheme to secure to
the agents of the Government such supervision and regulation of the rates charged
by the railroads of the country engaged in interstate traffic as shall summarily and
effectively prevent the imposition of unjust or unreasonable rates."
2540 CONG. REC. 2234 (1906). "The corporation . . . is bound to render the
best service consistent with security of the capital embarked in it, and security
of capital includes the right to employ it at a profit. If the community is entitled
to the best service consistent with the safety of capital, the just rate to each individual must be the actual cost of the service rendered to him plus a reasonable
profit to the company. There can be no other rate consistent with justice, as a
All who use a railroad can not have their goods
moment's reflection will show ...
transported for less than the actual cost. If they did, in a very short space of
time the railway would be bankrupt and could not transport any goods at all,
because it has no source of revenue except the rates which it charges to the people
who use its facilities."
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mission's power had to be one of a flexible nature to enable the Commission to deal with the conditions affecting both carriers and shippers.20
Therefore, all the components that affect the rates and thereby the
economy of carriers is of concern to the Commission in the exercise of
its expert discretion in determining the reasonableness of rates. Indeed,
the Supreme Court has refused to take jurisdiction to determine the
components of rate charges where to do so would effect a readjustment
of the carrier's rate schedule. This the Court
held was a matter for
27
primary determination by the Commission.
Unquestionably, habitual damage to a commodity which must be
compensated by the carrier affects the over-all cost of the transportation
of that commodity regardless of the causes of such damage.28 In the
case of eggs, this cannot be absorbed through rate increases. 20 Tolerance
regulations offer one solution whereby adjustments for the habitual
breakage of eggs can be made without requiring over-all rate charges.
A tolerance is a margin of damage which must be exceeded before
a claim may be made for additional damage.3 0 Tolerances were originally allowed by the Commission to account for a difference in weights
of coal 3l and grain 32 at points of origin and at destination estimated to
be caused by moisture evaporation,33 and variances in outdoor railway
scales. 3 4

They were first applied to "current receipt" shell eggs in

Board of Trade of Kansas City v. United States, 314 U. S. 534, 546 (1942).
"The process of rate making is essentially empiric. The stuff of the process is
fluid and changing-the resultant of factors that must be valued as well as weighed.
Congress has therefore delegated enforcement of transportation policy to a permanent expert body and has charged it with the duty of being responsive to the dynamic character of transportation problems." Freas, Problems in Rateviaking,
23 I. C. C. PRACITIONERS' JouRNAL, 552 (March, 1956). ".... Ratemaking has been
referred to as a pragmatic business. By this is meant, no doubt, that in a rate
structure the individual considerations are so balanced and interdependent that a
manipulation of a part calls for a consideration of the whole, and that the proper
functioning of the whole depends upon the adequacy of the parts. .. ."
27 Armour & Co. v. Alton R. R., 312 U. S. 195 (1941) ; See also Note 2, following 49 U. S. C. A. § 15 (1929).
28 LOCKLIN, ECONOMICS OF TRANSPORTATION 143 (4th ed. 1954). "[D]ifferences
in rates may be explained on two grounds. First, there are differences in the cost
of service. Some articles are more expensive to transport than others-some require more expensive types of equipment; some require special facilities of one
sort or another; some require expedited service; some are more bulky than others,
and hence the cost, per unit of weight, is greater than when the weight-density is
greater. Differences in liability and risk also make differences in the cost of service." [Emphasis added.]
2" Utah Poultry & Farmers Coop. v. United States, 119 F. Supp. 846, 851 (D. C.
Utah 1954) ; See LOCKLIN, EcoNomics oF TRANSPORTATION 154 (4th ed. 1954).
Probably one reason a higher rate could not be charged for eggs is that the value
of the eggs at the market price could not stand the higher rate.
2"

'0 Northwestern Tariff & Service Bureau, Inc. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St.

Paul Ry., 47 I. C. C. 549 (1917).
" Ibid. It Re Weighing of Freight, 28 I. C. C. 7 (1913).
2 A. B. Crouch Grain Co. v. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 41 L C. C.
717 (1916).
22 In Re Weighing of Freight, 28 I. C. C. 7 (1913).
24 Weight Tolerance Rule, 192 I. C. C. 71 (1933).
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1919. 35 A tolerance allowance was first attacked as "limiting the liability of carriers in violation of § 20(11)" in a Commission hearing in
1916.36

At that time, as in the lower court hearing of the principal

case,37 the Commission defended the tolerance regulations on the grounds
that the "limitation was not against losses caused by the carrier, but
rather against liability for losses due to the inherent nature of the com33s
Therefore,
modities themselves, and attributable to no human agency."
it contended, the regulation did not violate § 20(11) of the Interstate
Commerce Act. Such an argument is justified by the necessity for making some type of rate adjustment for habitual shrinkage or breakage
which affect the transportation cost of grain, coal and eggs. Nevertheless, there is a possible argument that the Interstate Commerce Commission inadvertently may have come through the back door to a violation of § 20 (11) of the Interstate Commerce Act.
The Limitations in § 20(11)
The Carmack 9 and Cummins4" amendments to § 20(11)41 were
passed during the early part of this century. The first was intended to
establish uniformity of obligation and liability among carriers. The second was intended to insure the shipper full recovery for the value of his
goods transported by the carrier in the event of damage.
Prior to the Carmack amendment:
".... [T]he Federal courts sitting in various States were following the local rule, a carrier being held liable in one court when
" National Poultry, Butter & Egg Ass'n v. New York Cent. R. R., 52 I. C. C.
47 (1919).
"oA. B. Crouch Grain Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 41 I. C. C.
717, 717-718 (1916).
" Utah Poultry & Farmers Coop. v. United States, 119 F. Supp. 846, 849 (D. C.
Utah 1954).
"A. B. Crouch Grain Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 41 I. C. C.
717 (1916).
"'34 STAT. 593 (1906). The Carmack Amendment read as follows:
"That any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company receiving property for transportation from a point in one state to a point in another state shall
issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor, and shall be liable to the lawful holder
thereof for any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company to which
such property may be delivered or over whose line or lines such propety may pass
and no contract, receipt, rule or regulation shall exempt such common carrier, railroad, or transportation company from the liability hereby imposed; Provided, that
nothing in this section shall deprive the holder of such receipt or bill of lading of
any remedy or right of action which he has under existing law.
"That the common carrier, railroad, or transportation company issuing such
receipt or bill of lading shall be entitled to recover from the common carrier, railroad, or transportation company on whose line the loss, damage or injury shall
have been sustained the amount of such loss, damage, or injury as it may be required to pay to the owners of such property, as may be evidenced by any receipt,
judgment or transcript thereof."
"38 STAT. 1196 (1915).
"124 STAT. 386 (1887), as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 20(11) (1953). See note 19
supra.
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under the same state of facts he would be exempt from liability in
another; hence this branch of interstate commerce was being subjected to such diversity of legislative and judicial holding that it
was practically impossible for a shipper engaged in a business that
extended beyond the confines of his own State, or a carrier whose
lines were extensive, to know without considerable investigation
and trouble, and even then oftentimes with but little certainty,
what would be the carrier's actual responsibility as to goods delivered to it for transportation from one state to another. The
congressional action has made an end to this diversity ....-42
The Carmack Amendment, however, had unforeseen effects upon the
common law liability of carriers. In Adams Express Co. v. Croninger 8
the Supreme Court construed the act to permit a carrier to limit a shipper's recovery for damages to the value of the property stated on the bill
of lading. Under this construction, a carrier could file with the Commission two rates, one to cover commodities shipped at an agreed
44
value, and a second and higher rate to cover unlimited carrier liability.
In some instances while two rates were allowed, only the first rate was
incorporated into the tariff schedules published under the auspices of
the Commission. If this was the case, the second rate was agreed upon
by the individual carrier and shipper when the shipper did not elect to
ship under the "agreed" value and its corresponding published rate.40
Since the second rate was not always supervised by the Commission,
there were abuses. In some instances the second rate was so exhorbitant
that the shipper was obliged to accept the lower rate and the corresponding lower valuation of his goods to stay in business. 46
The Cummins Amendment was passed in 1915 to reinstate the liability of the carrier as it had been prior to 1915. 47 To the earlier act the
'Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, 505 (1913).
"226 U. S. 491 (1913).
"It Re The Cummins Amendment, 33 I. C. C. 683 (1915).
46 Id.
at 686-687.
" 51 CoNG. REc. 9624 (1914). Such a situation existed in the case of livestock:
"All the railroads at this time have rates dependent on value in the shipment of
live stock. The value is determined by the declaration of the shipper .... If the
shipper wants full value, and the value is not beyond the ordinary or common value
of registered or pure-bred stock, he must pay 10 per cent or 15 per cent or 25
per cent more than the rate upon an ordinary live-stock shipment. That rate as
applied to the ordinary case is prohibitive; the shipper cannot pay it and do business for, of course, the amount of it is absurdly high. It is based only on the idea
that the higher rate is necessary to compensate the railway company for the increased risk; but it is greatly more than that in all the cases I have examined. ...
The live-stock shipments that are made under the rule established by the railroad
companies, and which we seek to overturn here, I suppose, constitute 90 per cent of
all the
shipments that would be affected by this rule."
41 Id. at 9621. "In this bill we have tried to restore to the shippers of this country not all, but a measure, of the rights which they possessed and which they exercised prior to the passage of the Carmack amendment, which inadvertently destroyed
those rights. Therefore we provided that the railroad company should be liable to
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Cummins Amendment added: "[S]hall be liable to the lawful holder of
such receipt or bill of lading or to any party entitled to recovery therefrom, whether such receipt or bill of lading has been issued or not, for
the full, actual loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it.
[Emphasis added.] Thus, the import of the act was to save the shipper
from the risk which he had been previously forced to take in accepting
the lower rate, and to prevent carriers from limiting their liability.
This amendment was passed by Congress while it was charged with
indignation over the repercussions of the decision in the Croninger
case. At that time there appears to have been no consideration of the
effect that § 20(11) would have on the other sections of the Interstate
Commerce Act, the Hepburn Amendment, and the rate making power of
the Commission. It is, therefore, submitted that Congress did not intend to undermine the Commission's power to determine the fair cost
of transportation.
Nevertheless, the amendment did amount to a fiat by Congress to
the Commission prohibiting it, in the course of its general rate making
power, from limiting the liability of carriers, in any manner inconsistent
with the act. The Commission could no longer approve schedules whereby the individual shipper would be obliged to contract away his common
law right to recover the full value of his goods.
However, Congress intended the exemptions which were inherent in
48
the common law rule of the liability of carriers to be part of the law.
The carrier was not to be "an insurer against the act of God, or the
49
The
public enemy, the unprecedented storm or anything of the kind."
in
the
last, it is submitted, includes damage "for breakage unavoidable
50
But can the Interstate Commerce Commission make
nature of things."
the lawful holder of the receipt or any other person to the full actual loss, damage
or injury caused by it." See also Notes, 20 MICH. L. REv. 765 (1920); 1 NEw
YORK LAW REv. 108 (1924): 12 VA. L. Rv. 235 (1925).
A
" In Re The Cummins Amendment, 33 I. C. C. 682, 695 (1915). "...
carrier, after the Cummins amendment goes into effect, may not contract to limit
its liability for loss or damage caused by it to the property. There is, however,
no inhibition as to the limitation of the liability of a carrier for losses not caused
by it or a succeeding carrier to which the property may be delivered. The amendment has expressly reapplied the limitation of the prior act with respect to loss or
damage caused by the carriers chargeable therewith. It follows, therefore, that
the interpretation applied to the act before it was amended is equally applicable
to the amendment in so far as the latter affects the right of a carrier to establish
rates conditional upon the shipper's assumption of the entire risk of loss attributable
to causes beyond the carrier's control. From this it follows that under the amendment a contract or tariff may lawfully limit to a reasonable maximum the liability
of a carrier for losses which it does not cause."
51 CONG. RFc. 9621 (1914).
oSecretary of Agriculture v. United States, 350 U. S.162, 173 (1956). ".
[T]he Cummins Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, §20(11), does not
constitute an affirmative congressional formulation of a carrier's liability for damage
to goods transported by it. The legal import of that Amendment is to bar the Interstate Commerce Commission from legalizing the tariffs limiting the common-law
liability of a carrier for such damage.

The common law, in imposing liability,
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tolerance regulations of uniform effectiveness on the premise that the
allowances take care of damage caused by the inherent nature of the
goods?
The solution to this problem lies in the procedure for determining
that shrinkage and breakage is loss caused by the natural propensity of
the goods.
Determination of Common Law Liability
At common law a carrier is in the nature of an insurer.Y' The
carrier is exempted from liability only when the loss results from acts
of God, the public enemy, the inherent vice of the goods, or the default of
52
the shipper.
After the shipper has established his case by proving that the property
was in good condition when received, and in damaged condition when
delivered, the carrier must bring the case within one of the excepted
causes.5 3 In the case of eggs the carrier must show that the damage was
occasioned by inherent defects in the eggs.54 The same rule applies
where the shipper has shown loss in transit of grain or coal.55 Thus each
case must stand on its own facts as to whether loss was caused by the
inherent vice of the goods. No court is bound to allow any percentage
of damage to go uncompensated if it finds that the damage was caused
by the carrier. In addition, the courts vary in their determination as to
what constitutes causes beyond the control of the carrier. For instance,
while one carrier has been held liable for damage to eggs frozen in
57
transit,5 6 another was not liable for onions similarly damaged.
dispensed with proof by a shipper of a carrier's negligence in causing the damage.
But for breakage unavoidable in the nature of things-whether nature be operating within a thing or from without, it is equally an 'inherent vice'-there would
be no liability since the common law did not impose a liability unrelated to the
carrier's conduct."
51 Beale, The Carrier'sLiability: Its History, 11 HARV. L. Rav. 158 (1897).
r2 Joseph Toker Co., Inc. v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 12 N. J. 608, 97 A. 2d 598,
599 3(1953).
" Annot., 53 A. L. R. 997 (1928).
5' Mitchell v. The United States Express Co., 46 Iowa
214 (1877).
" In the following cases the carrier clearly had the burden of establishing that
loss was caused by the inherent defect of the commodity. Joseph Toker Co. Inc.
v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 12 N. 3. 608, 97 A. 2d 598 (1953) (the defendant failed
to prove that weight loss was due to the natural evaporation of moisture from
coal during transit) ; Smith v. Louisville & N. R. R., 202 Iowa 292, 209 N. W. 465
(1926) (the defendant had the burden of establishing that loss was caused by the
evaporation of moisture from coal and was therefor loss caused by a natural propensity) ; National Elevator Co. v. Great Northern Ry., 137 Minn. 217, 163 N. W.
164 (1917) (defendant had the burden of establishing that the loss of weight from
grain was due to the evaporation of moisture). In the following cases evaporation
of moisture was judicially recognized as a "natural propensity" causing loss: Nye
Schrader-Fowler Co. v. Chicago & N. W. R. R., 106 Neb. 149, 182 N. W. 967
(1921) ; Shellaberger Elevator Co. v. Illinois Central R. R., 212 IlI. App. 1 (1917).
In the following case evaporation of moisture causing loss of weight in wheat was
recognized as a "natural propensity" by statute: Cardwell v. Union Pacific R. R.,
90 Kan. 707, 136 Pac. 244 (1913).
" Akerly v. Railway Express Agency, 96 N. H. 396, 77 A. 2d 856 (1951).
" Close v. Missouri Pac. R. R., - La. App. -, 191 So. 596 (1936).
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These decisions of the courts are beyond the control of the Interstate
Commerce Commission because under § 958 of the Interstate Commerce
Act the jurisdiction of the Commission over claims is confined to claims
arising from violations of the Act.59 Thus any regulations regarding
the "inherent nature" of the commodities that the Commission may make
are at best only guides for the discretion of the courts. 60 Under these
circumstances the tolerance regulations have no legal effect and the
attempts of the Commission to adjust the economic unbalance created
by habitual shrinkage or breakage are ineffectual if shippers do not continue to accept claim settlements based on the tolerance regulations. 6 '
Admittedly, the above reasoning has its logic. However, it is submitted that to deny effect to tolerance regulations because the Commission has no jurisdiction over claims arising out of the carrier's common
law liability is basically unsound. The Commission does have jurisdiction to determine what service is to be offered for what rate. The extent
of breakage or other loss which as a matter of experience is chargeable
to the nature of the goods is an inherent part of determining the cost of
" 24 STAT. 382 (1887), as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 9 (1953) is in part as follows:
"Any person or persons claiming to be damaged by any common carrier subject to
the provisions of this chapter may either make complaint to the commission as hereinafter provided for, or may bring suit in his or their own behalf for the recovery
of the damnages for which such common carrier may be liable under the provisions
of this chapter... ." [Emphasis added.]
" Van Patten v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 81 Fed. 545, 546 (C. C. Iowa 1897).
'0 An example of the attitudes that courts may take regarding tolerances is conveyed by the following: Joseph Toker Co., Inc., v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 12 N. J. 608,
615, 97 A. 2d 598, 602 (1953). In reference to a tolerance regulation for the shrinkage of the weight of coal the court said: "The tolerance related solely to freight
charges within the jurisdiction and control of the Interstate Commerce Commission
and had no relation to loss claims beyond the jurisdiction and control of the Commission. It is not disputed that the Commission has no authority and does not purport to
exercise authority over civil claims for the recovery of the value of property lost
The shipper's right to assert such claim against the initial carrier
in transit ....
where, as here, there has been an interstate shipment is expressly provided for in
the Carmack Amendment which provides not only that the initial carrier shall be
liable but also that, apart from exceptions not material here, there shall be no
limitation of liability for the full actual loss. Neither the carriernor the commission
could lawfully provide that liability to shipper for loss of coal in transit shall not
accrue until the loss exceeds 12'Ao of coal shipped."

[Emphasis added.]

Shella-

berger Elevator Co. v. Illinois Central R. R., 212 Il1. App. 1, 6 (1917). In reference to an allowance for shrinkage of the weight of corn the court said: "The
liability of a carrier for loss or damages to an interstate shipment is governed by
the federal law and all State statutes ..

are thereby superseded ....

The only loss

or damage the appellant is liable for under the Carmack Amendment is the loss or
damage caused by it, and shrinkage would not come within that rule unless the proof
should show the shrinkage was caused by it." [Emphasis added.]
"lProbably the greatest number of claims are settled outside of the courts. For
this reason, if most shippers and carriers continued to adhere to the tolerance regulations when settling their claims, the Commission's purpose would be accomplished. That is, the economic adjustment what the Commission intended would
operate in the larger number of cases. However, quaere whether shippers will
continue to allow adjustments on the basis of tolerances if the Commission cannot legally enforce the regulations, and the courts will do no more than use them
as guides, and in some instances will not recognize them at all as in the Toker case,
12 N. J. 608, 97 A. 2d 598 (1953).
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transportation. The complexity of the economic factors involved in the
tolerance problem calls for solution by the expert body.
Since tolerance regulations seem to be reasonable measures for adjusting losses caused by commodities which are by their nature inevitably
damaged in transportation, it may be desirable to make express provisions for such regulations. The obvious solution is to amend § 20 (11)
of the Interstate Commerce Act so as to give the Commission the power
either (1) to construe the meaning of "inherent vice" so that it will have
uniform application in the courts in suits for loss or damage, or (2) as
suggested by one writer, 62 to amend the act so as to allow the "Commission to provide tolerances when reasonably justified." The latter would
seem to be the better solution as it would best cover the complex economic factors involved and allow the Commission greater discretion in
striking a balance between the interests of the shippers and carriers.
HARRIET D. HOLT.
Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court over State
Courts
In the recent case of Naim v. Naim,' the United States Supreme
Court dismissed an appeal from the Supreme Court of Virginia because
the federal question was not presented in "clean-cut and concrete form." 2
The facts of the case were not in dispute. Suit was brought by
appellee, a white woman duly domiciled in Virginia. The appellant was
a non-resident Chinese. The parties left Virginia, married in North
Carolina, and returned immediately to Virginia. There they cohabited
as man and wife in direct contravention of the Virginia miscegenation
law which forbade their marriage. 3 Both conceded that they left Virginia to marry for the purpose of evading this law. At the instigation
of the wife, the marriage was annulled by the Circuit Court of the City
of Portsmouth, and an appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia was
based on the sole ground that the Virginia miscegenation statute was
unconstitutional because it contravened the due process and equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court of
Virginia affirmed the decision of the lower court, expressly holding that
the Virginia statute in question was not repugnant to the federal constitution. 4 On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, the
62103 PENN. L. Rv. 113, 115 (1954).
197 Va. 80, 90 S. E. 2d 749 (1956); vacated and remanded 350 U. S. 891
(1956) ; reaff'd 197 Va. 734, 90 S.E. 2d 849 (1956) ; appeal dismissed 350 U. S.
985 (1956).
'Naim v. Naim, 350 U. S. 891 (1956).
'VA. CODE § 20-54 (1950). The Virginia miscegenation statute declares a marriage between a white person and a person of any other race a nullity.
'Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 90 S. E. 2d 749 (1956).

